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THE INCOHERENCE OF DEFENDANT
AUTONOMY
ROBERT E. TOONE*
The idea of individual autonomy has become central to the
Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence. Yet in the context of
a criminal trial, this Article argues, the idea makes no sense. The
choices that criminal defendants face at trial-such as whether to
relinquish their right to counsel, present mental health defenses, or
offer mitigating evidence at a capital sentencing hearing-are
constructed and circumscribed by the state and do not involve a
range of options that ordinary people would consider essential to
defining their own concept of existence. It was therefore a mistake
for the Supreme Court to base its decision in Faretta v. California
on the premise that defendant autonomy is a constitutional value
that trumps, or at least counterbalances, interests such as accuracy,
fairness, and efficiency. This reasoning has empowered defendants'
self-destructive impulses and changed how courts resolve important
issues of substantive law. It has also undermined, not advanced, the
accusatorial and adversarial traditions that define our system of
criminal justice. The Article concludes that while the current
Court's skepticism about Faretta is justified, it should not overturn
that ruling without also addressing the structural problems that its
rhetoric of 'free choice" has masked.
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INTRODUCTION
Of all the constitutional rights recognized in American criminal
procedure, the right to self-representation is surely the most likely to
be eliminated by the Supreme Court in the foreseeable future-and
deservedly so. The right, established by the Court in its 1975 decision
Faretta v. California,1 has been assailed by liberals such as Judge
Stephen Reinhardt,' conservatives such as Kenneth Starr,3 and
countless other judges, practitioners, journalists, and law professors.
The Supreme Court itself undermined Faretta's doctrinal foundation
in 2000 when it rejected the claim that defendants have a right to
represent themselves on appeal,4 and a majority of the current justices
appear skeptical about the validity of the Court's earlier reasoning.5
Yet surprisingly, none of Faretta's critics has challenged the
radical premise that underlies the decision: that defendant autonomy
is a constitutional value which trumps, or at least counterbalances,
society's interests in fairness, order, efficiency, and accurate
outcomes. Acknowledging that the right to self-representation has no
textual basis in the Constitution and, when exercised, usually
increases the likelihood that the defendant will be convicted
regardless of actual culpability, the Court in Faretta justified its ruling
on the ground that the Constitution broadly protects the autonomy of
criminal defendants-that the "free choice" of defendants must be
respected notwithstanding concern for the objective fairness of the
proceeding.6 This reasoning has had a substantial impact on the
1. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
2. See United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1101-02, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999).
(Reinhardt, J., concurring).
3. See Adina Matusow, Supremes Consider Risks of Self-Representation, LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. 17,2004, at 8.
4. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000). See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 15-26.
6. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833-34.
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criminal justice system, and not just with pro se defendants. In death
penalty cases, courts have interpreted Faretta to mean that defendants
have a right to refuse to present mitigating evidence at sentencing,
thus frustrating the individualized consideration requirement of the
Eighth Amendment. Faretta has also transformed the case law on
mental health defenses to the point that it is now widely accepted that
such defenses may not be imposed over defendants' objections.
This Article argues that the very idea of defendant autonomy is
philosophically incoherent and inconsistent with other fundamental
traditions of American criminal justice. Part I examines the
autonomy rationale in Faretta and its impact on the areas of the death
penalty, mental health defenses, and criminal law scholarship
generally. It shows that even the most vigorous critics of Faretta have
implicitly endorsed defendant autonomy by weighing that interest
against society's interests in efficiency and fairness. Part II explains
that even though the freedom of criminal defendants is central to the
two major traditions that distinguish American criminal justice-the
accusatorial tradition and the adversarial process-Faretta broke
sharply from these traditions by limiting the ability of courts to
protect defendants from their self-destructive conduct. Part III
distinguishes Faretta-style autonomy from the Supreme Court's
application of the concept in its substantive due process rulings to
protect certain intimate decisions and activities by people in the
outside world, and then draws upon the writings of Joseph Raz and
other modern philosophers to explain why the concept of defendant
autonomy is incoherent and empty. Finally, this Article concludes
that in the context of criminal procedure, the idea of autonomy is less
an affirmation of defendants' dignity and "free choice" than a
rhetorical flourish that sidesteps more difficult questions about
inequality and injustice in the criminal justice system, the proper
allocation of authority between attorneys and clients, and other
structural problems. Certainly, the Supreme Court should reconsider
its ruling in Faretta, but it should not take that step without also
reexamining the structural problems that led it to establish the Faretta
right in the first place.
I. FARETTA AND ITS FALLOUT
A. A Right and Rationale in Doubt
Charged with grand theft, Anthony Faretta was concerned about
the quality of his appointed counsel. The public defender's office, he
2005] 623
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told the judge, was "very loaded down with ... a heavy case load,"
and having previously represented himself in a criminal case, Faretta
believed he could do the job better.7 After conducting an inquiry into
Faretta's knowledge of evidence and procedure, the judge rejected his
request, concluding that self-representation would not serve "the
ends of justice and requirements of due process."' Faretta was found
guilty and sentenced to prison, and the California appellate courts
affirmed.
On review of Faretta's conviction, the six-justice majority for the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged that it was "not an easy
question" whether to recognize a constitutional right of criminal
defendants to proceed without the assistance of counsel.9 Justice
Stewart observed:
There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to
conduct his own defense seems to cut against the grain of this
Court's decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no
accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been
accorded the right to the assistance of counsel. For it is surely
true that the basic thesis of those decisions is that the help of a
lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair trial.1"
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the trial judge had violated
the Sixth Amendment by rejecting Faretta's request to proceed
without counsel.
The Court based its holding in part on the history of the Anglo-
American criminal justice system and broad notions of liberty
underlying the Sixth Amendment and the rest of the Constitution.
Justice Stewart set forth a detailed historical account arguing that the
right to self-representation is grounded in the English and American
legal traditions." He invoked "the virtues of self-reliance and a
traditional distrust of lawyers" characteristic of the American
colonists,2 and contrasted this tradition with that of the Star
Chamber, a seventeenth-century British tribunal whose mandatory-
counsel provision exemplified its "disregard of basic individual
rights." 3
7. Id. at 807.
8. Id. at 810 & n.4.
9. Id. at 807.
10. Id. at 832-33 (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 821-32.
12. Id. at 826.
13. Id. at 821.
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Commentators were quick to challenge this historical account at
the time,'4 and, extraordinarily, the Court has since repudiated it.
Twenty-five years after Faretta, the Court ruled in Martinez v. Court
of Appeal of California5 that defendants do not have the right to
represent themselves on direct appeal. In Martinez, Justice Stevens
demonstrated the uselessness of the historical evidence that the Court
had previously relied on, observing that it "pertained to times when
lawyers were scarce, often mistrusted, and not readily available to the
average person accused of crime."16 Many of the precedents cited in
Faretta posited a right of self-representation as a "sword" for the
prosecution for the purpose of concluding that an unrepresented
defendant had waived an important right.17 Precedents from a time in
which poor defendants had no choice but to represent themselves are
of limited value in a post-Gideon era. 8
14. See, e.g., Howard J. Schwab, How Far Faretta" Creating Implied Constitutional
Rights, 6 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (1977) (accusing the Court of taking "bits and
pieces out of the past" to support its argument); Marlee S. Myers, Note, A Fool for a
Client. The Supreme Court Rules on the Pro Se Right, 37 U. PrTT. L. REV. 403, 407-09
(1975) (arguing that the majority's historical analysis was both irrelevant and incorrect);
Kenneth J. Weinberger, Note, A Constitutional Right to Self-Representation, 25 DEPAUL
L. REV. 774, 779-80 (1976) (suggesting that the Court incorrectly assumed the Framers
regarded self-representation as fundamental).
15. 528 U.S. 152 (2000).
16. Id. at 156.
17. Id. at 157 & n.4. Because the Court found that the Sixth Amendment is
concerned solely with trials, not appeals, it quickly dismissed as irrelevant the Faretta
Court's discussion of the "language and spirit" of the Amendment. Id. at 159-60. It did,
however, implicitly undermine this argument by referring to Faretta's constitutional
interpretation as "nontextual," id. at 160, which it of course is, and the discussion of
British Star Chamber practices in this context, see Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821-23, as
vulnerable to the same criticism leveled in Martinez against the other historical evidence
in Faretta.
18. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (holding that indigent
criminal defendants have a fundamental right to the assistance of counsel at trial).
Drafted in response to a common law rule prohibiting defense counsel in felony cases, the
Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment originally preserved only a
defendant's right to be represented by retained counsel. It did not provide any right to
defendants who could not afford a lawyer's services. Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The
Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 439 (1993);
Alexander Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 7-9 (1944). In a series of rulings beginning in the 1930s, the Court departed from that
original understanding. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932) (applying the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in reversing convictions and death
sentences of indigent black defendants who had been tried without assistance of counsel).
In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938), the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment
guaranteed appointed counsel to federal criminal defendants who could not afford to
retain counsel on their own. Id. at 468. In Gideon, the Court extended this right to felony
defendants in state court, and the right now attaches to all defendants who might be
imprisoned if convicted. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002); Argersinger v.
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The other major rationale in Faretta was the autonomy of
criminal defendants. The Court used eloquent but depthless rhetoric
to champion the value of unrestrained individual freedom. The right
to self-representation, it wrote, is compelled by not only the logic of
the Sixth Amendment, but more generally by "that respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law."' 9 The right had been
implicitly sanctioned by the Framers, since "whatever else may be
said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no
doubt that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice."2
The autonomy of a criminal defendant must be protected, even if
doing so enables him to conduct his own defense ultimately to his
own detriment. 1 As the Court later summarized, its ruling in Faretta
provided "constitutional protection of the defendant's free choice
independent of concern for the objective fairness of the
proceeding."2
This rationale, too, was cast into doubt by the Court's more
recent ruling in Martinez. Gone was the soaring individualist
rhetoric. Indeed, although the Martinez Court acknowledged that "a
respect for individual autonomy" was a basis for its earlier ruling, it
spent almost no time discussing what autonomy means or how it
relates to criminal defendants. Instead, through the use of a selective
quote from Faretta, the Martinez Court recapitulated the autonomy
rationale as a question of an attorney's undivided loyalty to her
client,23 and then quickly minimized its importance in the context of
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,37 (1972).
19. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
20. Id. at 833-34.
21. Id. at 834.
22. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984) (stating that the right to self-representation "exists to affirm
the dignity and autonomy of the accused"); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Faretta establishes that the right to counsel is more than a right
to have one's case presented competently and effectively."); Chapman v. United States,
553 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that "the right to represent oneself is not 'result-
oriented' "). See generally George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for
More Careful Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193, 219 (1977) (citing Faretta for the proposition
that "respect for human dignity" may entail "permitting a defendant to make decisions
concerning his future that most would regard as unwise and that may even have an
adverse effect on some of the other interests involved"); Alfredo Garcia, The Right to
Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 93
(1991) (describing Faretta as "the zenith of the Court's efforts in safeguarding the
individual's dignity").
23. The Court reasoned:
As we explained in Faretta, at the trial level "[tio force a lawyer on a defendant
[Vol. 83
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criminal appeals. It wrote:
In light of our conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does not
apply to appellate proceedings, any individual right to self-
representation on appeal based on autonomy principles must be
grounded in the Due Process Clause. Under the practices that
prevail in the Nation today, however, we are entirely
unpersuaded that the risk of either disloyalty or suspicion of
disloyalty is a sufficient concern to conclude that a
constitutional right of self-representation is a necessary
component of a fair appellate proceeding. We have no doubt
that instances of disloyal representation are rare. In both trials
and appeals there are, without question, cases in which
counsel's performance is ineffective. Even in those cases,
however, it is reasonable to assume that counsel's performance
is more effective than what the unskilled appellant could have
provided for himself.24
Pointing to the various restrictions that have developed with respect
to the Faretta right, the Martinez Court wrote that the interest of
defendant autonomy was "at times" outweighed by "the
government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the
trial."25 In the appellate context, where the autonomy interest of the
defendant, being no longer presumed innocent, is less compelling,
"the balance between the two competing interests surely tips in favor
of the State."26
Martinez revealed a Court that is ill at ease with its prior ruling
and reasoning, but unsure whether to repudiate them altogether.
Instead of confronting the autonomy rationale head on, the Court
essentially avoided the issue. It transformed a sweeping assertion of
individual free choice into a narrow, pragmatic concern about the
loyalty of one's attorney-and even that concern sidestepped the
broader concerns raised by Anthony Faretta about the adequacy of
his indigent defense counsel. As the next Section will explain, the
can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him." On appellate
review, there is surely a similar risk that the appellant will be skeptical of whether
a lawyer, who is employed by the same government that is prosecuting him, will
serve his cause with undivided loyalty.
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 160 (2000) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
24. Id. at 161.
25. Id. at 162.
26. Id. at 162-63.
20051
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Martinez Court's reductionist approach to the autonomy rationale
belied the sweeping impact it has had on the criminal justice system.
B. The Rise of Defendant Autonomy
Although Chief Justice Burger warned in dissent that the
criminal justice system should not be used "as an instrument of self-
destruction,"27 none of the justices foresaw the extent to which Faretta
would empower the self-destructive impulses of criminal defendants.
The most conspicuous fallout of Faretta has been in high-profile
criminal cases where volatile, mentally unstable defendants-Colin
Ferguson, Theodore Kaczynski, Jack Kevorkian, and Zaracarias
Moussaoui being just a few examples-have represented themselves
to disastrous ends. 28 In these cases and many others, defendants have
turned trials into circuses through the device of self-representation.
As Professor John Decker observed on the occasion of Faretta's 20th
anniversary, "Little did the Court realize the extent of the chaos it
created. As a consequence of Faretta there are 'trials' in courts
throughout the country that make a mockery of justice and disrupt
courtroom procedure. 9
This problem is serious enough, and judges continue to struggle
to maintain order when defendants invoke their Faretta right. But the
impact of the Faretta ruling far exceeds the procedural and logistical
problems raised by self-representation. By establishing defendant
autonomy as an independent constitutional value, Faretta has
radically changed the way courts resolve important issues of
substantive law. The two most significant issues that Faretta has
affected involve the death penalty and mental health defenses.
27. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 840 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
28. See Marie Higgins Williams, The Pro Se Criminal Defendant, Standby Counsel,
and the Judge: A Proposal for Better-Defined Roles, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 789-92
(2000) (summarizing the trials of Long Island road shooter Colin Ferguson, "Unabomber"
Theodore Kaczynski, and "Suicide Doctor" Jack Kevorkian); Seymour M. Hersh, The
Twentieth Man, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 23, 2002, at 56, 74-76 (describing dozens of
handwritten motions filed by Zacarias Moussaoui containing curses aimed at the trial
judge and wild theories about government's complicity in the September 11th attacks);
Tom Jackman, Moussaoui May Have Doomed His Defense, WASH. POST., July 15, 2002, at
A3 (same); Trisha Renaud, Tangled Mind, Tangled Case Suit Says Doctors, Others Share
Blame for Mentally Ill Killer's Crime, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Mar. 24, 2000, at 1
(describing pro se murder defendant's trial testimony "in which he claimed to be God's
personal psychiatrist, vowed to slit God's throat in a sneak attack, demanded death and
then threatened jurors should they not grant his wish").
29. John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An
Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 485 (1996).
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1. The Death Penalty
The death penalty is our most severe criminal sanction, reserved
for the most heinous offenses and the most incorrigible criminals.
The Supreme Court has consistently treated death as a qualitatively
different kind of punishment than imprisonment,3 ° and since 1972 it
has developed a separate and complex body of Eighth Amendment
law to ensure that the death penalty is imposed fairly and objectively.
From this jurisprudence two fundamental principles have
emerged. First, the discretion of capital sentencers in considering
aggravating circumstances must be channeled by clear and objective
standards.3' Second, defendants must be allowed to present as
mitigating any evidence relating to their character or record, or the
specific circumstances of the offense.32  Capital defendants
represented by competent counsel typically take advantage of this
"individualized consideration" principle by presenting a wealth of
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Such evidence can help a
sentencer to distinguish qualities that make the defendant less
deserving of execution than other similarly situated offenders, and
can lead the sentencer to understand the defendant as a human being,
something more difficult to sentence to death than the " 'sack of
cement' " that might otherwise be perceived.33
A properly litigated capital sentencing hearing is adversarial: the
state presents its strongest evidence and arguments why the
defendant deserves to be executed, and the defense counters with its
"case for life." If no mitigating evidence is presented, the hearing
becomes a one-sided affair, and the likelihood that death will be
imposed is high.
30. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06 (2002); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
31. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam), the Supreme
Court struck down Georgia's death penalty law. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07
(1976), the Court concluded that Georgia's revised capital statutory scheme, which
carefully circumscribed the class of people eligible for the death penalty, had eliminated
the previous statute's constitutional deficiencies. Subsequent cases have refined the
requirements of this anti-arbitrariness principle. See Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 46-
52 (1992); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362-63 (1988); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 876-87 (1983); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-33 (1980).
32. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
33. Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39
STAN. L. REV. 461, 484 (1987) (quoting SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, TRIAL OF
THE PENALTY PHASE 3 (1981)); see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God
Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102
YALE L.J. 835, 845 (1992) (stating that the "individualized consideration" principle "is
premised on the recognition that not all first-degree murderers are similarly situated").
2005]
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What should be done with a defendant who, seeking death,
attempts to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence? This
predicament, which occurs with surprising frequency,34 has not been
directly addressed by the Supreme Court.35 Lower state and federal
courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to whether defendants
should be allowed to waive this safeguard. A few courts have ruled in
the negative, emphasizing the state's overriding interest in ensuring
that the death penalty is not erroneously imposed.36 The majority of
courts, however, have concluded that the Constitution permits
defendants to waive individualized consideration. In many of these
cases, the defendants elected to represent themselves pursuant to
Faretta. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the right to self-
representation cannot be denied simply because it "frustrate[s] the
[state's] statutory intention to provide the sentencing body with all
34. See, e.g., Gary Caldwell, Florida Capital Cases: July 1, 1994-June 30, 1995, 20
NOVA L. REV. 1255, 1284 (1996) (describing a "growing number of cases" in which
defendants seek to prevent presentation of mitigating evidence); Ross E. Eisenberg, The
Lawyer's Role When the Defendant Seeks Death, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 55-56 & n.5 (2001)
(documenting recent cases in Virginia where capital defendants pleaded guilty and asked
to be sentenced to death).
35. The various formulations of the Court's Eighth Amendment "individualization
consideration" requirement do not provide a clear answer. In some cases, individualized
consideration is expressed as a waivable entitlement of the defendant, who "must be
allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence." California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,
541 (1987). Other cases conceptualize it as a duty of the sentencer, who may not refuse to
consider or be prevented from considering mitigating evidence. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481
U.S. 393, 394 (1987); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14. In still other cases, the Court has
described the requirement as "essential" and "mandate[d]" by the Eighth Amendment,
language from which it can be inferred that mitigating evidence must be presented
regardless of a defendant's intentions. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 317 (1989),
abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Lockett, 438 U.S. at
605; see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (describing the requirement as "a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death").
36. In State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939 (N.J. 1989), the court found "persuasive policy
reasons ... based substantially on the State's 'interest in a reliable penalty
determination' " for not allowing a defendant to waive his right to present mitigating
evidence. Id. at 993 (citations omitted). It is self-evident, in the court's opinion, "that the
state and its citizens have an overwhelming interest in insuring that there is no mistake in
the imposition of the death penalty." Id. at 995. More recently, the Florida Supreme
Court reversed a trial court that, having failed to provide for an alternative means for the
jury to be advised of available mitigating evidence, nevertheless gave great weight to the
jury's recommendation of death. Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 361-62 (Fla. 2001)
("The failure of Muhammad to present any evidence in mitigation hindered the jury's
ability to fulfill its statutory role in sentencing in any meaningful way."); see also Morrison
v. State, 373 S.E.2d 506, 509 (Ga. 1988) (stating that "in view of the concern for reliability
inherent in our death-penalty procedures," trial courts "may have an obligation to conduct
an independent investigation into the possible existence of evidence in mitigation"). For a
general discussion of the individual and societal interests implicated by the Eighth
Amendment, see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-84 (1985).
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relevant mitigating evidence."37 In its review of the same case, the
Seventh Circuit agreed:
The Court in Faretta did not impose any restrictions upon a
defendant's right to refuse the assistance of counsel except to
state that the right must be "knowingly and intelligently"
waived .... If an individual in a capital sentencing hearing
wishes to proceed pro se, Faretta grants him the right to do so. 8
Whether the defendant intends to pursue a case in mitigation is
irrelevant to the Faretta inquiry. 9 The Utah, Illinois, and California
Supreme Courts have also approved death sentences reached after
pro se defendants presented limited or no mitigating evidence at
sentencing.4" And in a recent case, the Fifth Circuit issued a writ of
mandamus to prevent the trial court from appointing independent
counsel to present mitigating evidence against the pro se defendant's
wishes. 4
1
Even in cases where the defendants do not represent themselves,
courts have applied the reasoning of Faretta to uphold their waiver of
individualized consideration. Some have rejected ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on the ground that defendants retain "a
measure of personal control" over their defense, which encompasses,
at a minimum, "the right to decide whether to present a mitigation
defense.'42 Other courts have expressly ruled that defense attorneys
37. People v. Silagy, 461 N.E.2d 415,431 (Ill. 1984).
38. Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1007 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).
39. Id. at 1007-08.
40. People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 150 (Cal. 1990); People v. Coleman, 660 N.E.2d 919,
933 (Ill. 1995); State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731, 752-54 (Utah 2003); see also Nelson v.
State, 681 So. 2d 252, 255-56 & n.6 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that the defendant
was competent to represent himself and to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence);
State v. Harding, 670 P.2d 383, 400 (Ariz. 1983) (affirming death sentence of self-
represented defendant who had declined to present mitigating evidence); People v.
Stansbury, 846 P.2d 756, 784 (Cal. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 511 U.S. 318 (1994)
("The Sixth Amendment teaches that we should accord the competent defendant, even in
a capital case, this much control over his destiny."); Bishop v. State, 597 P.2d 273, 276
(Nev. 1979) (holding that defendant's refusal to present mitigating at the penalty phase did
not negate his Faretta right).
41. United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378, 381-85 (5th Cir. 2002).
42. Jeffries v. Blodgett, 771 F. Supp. 1520, 1552-53 (W.D. Wash. 1991), vacated on
other grounds, 988 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Trimble v. State, 693 S.W.2d 267, 278-
80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that counsel was not ineffective for following defendant's
instructions not to present certain mitigating evidence). Both of these cases relied on
prior rulings that allowed represented defendants not to present viable insanity defenses-
and those rulings in turn relied on Faretta. See State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115, 123-24
(Mo. 1981); State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216, 1219-24 (Wash. 1983); see also Snell v. Lockhart,
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have an affirmative duty to carry out the wishes of their death-
seeking clients. In 1982, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
Faretta guarantees a competent defendant "a constitutional right to
impose a condition of employment on his counsel," including the
condition that no mitigating evidence be presented.43 The Ohio
Supreme Court has reasoned:
The same value that guarantees a defendant a right to present
mitigating evidence-"the right of the defendant to be treated
with dignity as a human being"-also gives him the right to
decide what is in his own best interest. In our view, appellant's
suggestion that the court call its own witnesses in mitigation or
appoint an independent attorney to do so gives insufficient
deference to that value."
Similarly, the California Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the
rationale of Faretta to uphold the self-destructive preferences of
represented defendants.45 In one case, the court rejected the claim
that an attorney should present mitigating evidence over her client's
objections since, the court reasoned, the imposition of such a duty
might lead some defendants "to exercise their Sixth Amendment
right of self-representation before commencement of the guilt phase
in order to retain control over the presentation of evidence at the
penalty phase, resulting in a significant loss of legal protection for
these defendants during the guilt phase."46  In other words, a
defendant should be allowed to seek the death penalty because
otherwise he might be tempted to waive counsel at the start of trial.
Allowing the defendant to secure his own execution is a price worth
paying to keep him from actually invoking the Faretta right.
2. Mental Health Defenses
Mental health defenses are, at least ostensibly,47 designed to
791 F. Supp. 1367, 1385 (E.D. Ark. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 14 F.3d 1289 (8th Cir.
1994) ("If the petitioner has [the right to self-representation], he certainly has the right to
make such a fundamental and personal decision as whether to present mitigating evidence
following a capital murder conviction.").
43. State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 395 (La. 1982).
44. State v. Tyler, 553 N.E.2d 576, 585 (Ohio 1990) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
The court concluded that defense counsel was "obliged to honor appellant's choice 'out of
that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' " Id. (quoting Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)).
45. See People v. Howard, 824 P.2d 1315, 1345-46 (Cal. 1992); People v. Deere, 808
P.2d 1181, 1186-89 (Cal. 1991); People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 652-54 (Cal. 1989).
46. Lang, 782 P.2d at 653 (citations omitted).
47. See generally Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why
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protect those lacking sufficient mental responsibility from being
undeservedly convicted and punished. Yet the defenses carry
consequences distinct from those accompanying other affirmative
defenses. Defendants acquitted on the basis of the "insanity defense"
are typically committed for an indefinite period of time to a mental
hospital, and may in fact spend more time institutionalized that they
would if convicted of the offenses charged.48 Furthermore, society
attaches a stigma to mental health defenses that does not exist with
other affirmative defenses; even after release, an acquitted defendant
is subject to the social and economic opprobrium commonly
associated with mental illness.49
It is therefore common for criminal defendants to refuse to
present a mental health defenses at trial, even when such a defense
might reasonably lead to acquittal. The question has arisen whether,
and under what conditions, defense attorneys, prosecutors, or trial
judges should impose a defense over a defendant's objection."0
Again, the principle of defendant autonomy established in Faretta has
been critical to the debate.
In a line of cases beginning in the 1960s, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals held that, once sufficient questions are raised regarding a
defendant's mental illness, a trial court must make an insanity
determination and, if warranted, impose the insanity defense, even if
over the defendant's objections. In Whalem v. United States,"l the
court explained the "structural foundation" of the criminal law that
Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963) (arguing that the true purpose of the insanity defense is to
authorize the restraint of those who lack the capacity to satisfy the mental element of a
crime).
48. See id. at 868; see also Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 377 (D.C. 1979)
(observing that "a defendant may fear that an insanity acquittal will result in the
institution of commitment proceedings which lead to confinement in a mental institution
for a period longer than the potential jail sentence").
49. Frendak, 408 A.2d at 377 ("Although an insanity acquittal officially absolves the
defendant of all moral blame, in the eyes of many some element of responsibility may
remain. Thus, the insanity acquittee found to have committed criminal acts and labeled
insane may well see oneself 'twice cursed.' " (citing Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607, 610-
11 (D.C. Cir. 1969))).
50. See David S. Cohn, Offensive Use of the Insanity Defense: Imposing the Insanity
Defense over the Defendant's Objection, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 295 (1988); Anne
C. Singer, The Imposition of the Insanity Defense on an Unwilling Defendant, 41 OHIO ST.
L.J. 637, 639-40 (1980); Note, The Right and Responsibility of a Court to Impose the
Insanity Defense over the Defendant's Objection, 65 MINN. L. REV. 927, 927-29 (1981).
This question has long been resolved with respect to defendants' mental competence,
which is a separate issue. The Supreme Court has ruled that even if a defendant fails to
raise the issue, a court must do so itself if "the evidence raises a 'bona fide doubt' as to a
defendant's competence to stand trial." Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966).
51. 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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compelled its decision:
[T]he legal definition of insanity in a criminal case is a
codification of the moral judgment of society as respects a
man's criminal responsibility; and if a man is insane in the eyes
of the law, he is blameless in the eyes of society and is not
subject to punishment in the criminal courts.52
A trial judge's failure to raise the insanity defense sua sponte after
questions had been raised could be reversible error.53
A different approach to this problem, recognizing a right of
competent defendants to prohibit the interposition of mental health
defenses, emerged in the mid-1970s.54  It was set forth most
prominently by the D.C. Court of Appeals in Frendak v. United
States." In that case, the trial court imposed the insanity defense
against the defendant's wishes, and the jury found him not guilty by
reason of insanity. The appeals court reversed, holding that the
defendant's waiver decision had to be respected if it was made
voluntarily and intelligently. The validity of Whalem had been
undermined by the "underlying philosophy" of two recent Supreme
Court decisions-North Carolina v. Alford 6 and Faretta-both of
which emphasized the importance of allowing a defendant to make
fundamental decisions about his defense, no matter what the
52. Id. at 818. In an earlier case, the D.C. Circuit explained why punishment must be
withheld from those adjudged to be morally irresponsible: "To punish a man who lacks
the power to reason is as undignified and unworthy as punishing an inanimate object or
animal. A man who cannot reason cannot be subject to blame. Our collective conscience
does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame." Holloway v. United States,
148 F.2d 665,666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
53. United States v. Wright, 511 F.2d 1311, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Les v. Meredeth,
561 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Colo. 1977); People v. Anderson, 641 N.E.2d 591 (I11. App. Ct. 1994);
State v. Fernald, 248 A.2d 754, 760-61 (Me. 1968); Walker v. State, 321 A.2d 170, 174 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1974); State v. Pautz, 217 N.W.2d 190, 192 (Minn. 1974); State v. Kahn, 417
A.2d 585,592 (N.J. 1980).
54. See United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1164 (5th Cir. 1974); State v.
Johnson, 570 P.2d 503, 505 (Ariz. 1977); People v. Guaze, 542 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Cal. 1975);
People v. Geddes, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 888 (1991); Hooks v. State, 366 N.E.2d 645, 646-47
(Ind. 1977); Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 412, 418 (Ky. 1994); State v.
Lowenfield, 495 So. 2d 1245, 1252 (La. 1985); Treece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054, 1055 (Md.
1988); Commonwealth v. Federici, 696 N.E.2d 111, 114-15 (Mass. 1998); Anderson v.
State, 493 S.W.2d 681, 683-84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Johnson v. State, 17 P.3d 1008, 1015
(Nev. 2001) (per curiam); State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216, 1219-23 (Wash. 1983).
55. 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979).
56. 400 U.S. 25 (1970). In Alford, the Court concluded that the Constitution does not
prohibit the acceptance of a guilty plea from a defendant asserting his innocence, so long
as the trial judge is satisfied that there is a "strong factual basis" for the charge. Id. at 38.
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consequences. 7  The structural interests cited in Whalem-the
satisfaction of "some abstract concept of justice," according to the
court in Frendak-were clearly outweighed by the need to protect
defendants' autonomy.58
Frendak proved influential. In adopting the Frendak rule in
1983, the Washington Supreme Court relied heavily on the "right to
personally control one's own defense" which, it wrote, was implied by
the holding in Faretta.9 Ultimately, in the 1991 case United States v.
Marble,60 the D.C. Circuit abrogated its Whalem precedent.6 While
much of Marble focused on a perceived shift in society's views on
mentally ill criminals, the court also found that Whalem was "in
substantial tension" with the principle of defendant autonomy
recognized by the Supreme Court.62 Whalem rested on an outdated
view of public policy-not the "constitutional ground" established by
Faretta.63
3. The Persistence of Interest Balancing
It is not surprising, given its transformative effect on American
criminal justice, that Faretta has generated much criticism by courts,
commentators, and practitioners. Many have concluded that Faretta
was wrongly decided.' Their criticism, however, has generally
involved the same interest-balancing dynamic, weighing the
"autonomy" interests of criminal defendants against society's
interests in fairness, order, efficiency, and accurate outcomes. While
arguing that societal interests should win out in the end, they concede
the premise that defendant autonomy is a constitutional value
deserving protection. Perhaps the most compelling critic of Faretta
has been Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt, who explained in a
1999 opinion how the right to self-representation "frequently, though
not always," undermines the defendant's right to a fair trial.65 Even
57. Frendak, 408 A.2d at 375-76.
58. Id. at 376-78.
59. State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Wash. 1983).
60. 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 1547.
62. Id. at 1546-47.
63. Id. at 1547. But see Hendricks v. People, 10 P.3d 1231, 1236-38 (Colo. 2000)
(holding that Colorado's unique statutory provisions, which allow mental status defenses
to be raised over defendants' objections, were not trumped by the non-constitutional
grounds of Frendak).
64. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 29, at 596-98 (describing Faretta as "foolish Sixth
Amendment doctrine" and calling on the Supreme Court to "reconsider its jurisprudential
integrity").
65. United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J.,
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Judge Reinhardt, however, conceded that defendants' "dignitary
interests are important and are entitled to protection," arguing only
that those interests must be balanced "against the Due Process
Clause's fundamental guarantee that trials will be reliable, just, and
fair."66 And as we have seen, in its reexamination of the right to self-
representation in Martinez (which took note of Reinhardt's criticism
issued four months earlier),67 the Supreme Court also engaged in
interest-balancing. It described defendant autonomy as an interest
that, at the trial level, is sometimes outweighed by society's interest in
ensuring integrity and efficiency; at the appellate level, "the balance
between the two competing interests surely tips in favor of the
State."'
The same dynamic has dominated the academic debate over the
ability of capital defendants to waive the presentation of mitigating
evidence at sentencing. Professors Richard Bonnie and Welsh White
have argued that the capital defendant's "interest in controlling his
own fate" should not be subordinated to the "societal interest in the
integrity of the capital sentencing process," even when the defendant
seeks to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence.69
Commentators have reached the opposite result after balancing the
same interests, concluding that society's interest in "the integrity of
the process" or "preventing capricious sentencing" is sufficiently
compelling to outweigh the defendant's interests in "dignity" and
"free choice" in conducting his own defense.70 Similarly, with mental
concurring).
66. Id. at 1108 (Reinhardt, J., concurring); see also Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton,
Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: An Argument for Fairness and Against Self
Representation in the Criminal Justice System, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 227-29
(2000) (arguing that Faretta has "overstayed its ambiguous welcome" and that the need to
assure a fair trial should override the defendant's autonomy under the Sixth Amendment).
67. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161 n.9 (2000) (noting that
"[slome critics argue that the right to proceed pro se at trial in certain cases is akin to
allowing the defendant to waive his right to a fair trial").
68. Id. at 162-63.
69. Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363, 1387
(1988); see also Shawn A. Carter, The Pro Se Dilemma: Can Too Many Rights Make a
Wrong?, 62 LA. L. REV. 1299, 1319 (2002) ("[D]ue to the great importance of respecting a
defendant's free will to choose how to present his case, the pro se right should allow
defendants to withhold mitigating evidence and it should encompass a defendant's right to
choose whether or not to present a defense."); Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect
Execution, 48 U. PIrT. L. REV. 853, 863-69 (1987) (arguing that "capital defendant's
autonomy should be respected" even at the expense of conflicting societal interests).
70. See Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of
Court-Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence when the Defendant Advocates
Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95, 96 (1987); Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of
Death: An Argument for Restricting a Defendant's Right to Volunteer for Execution at
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health defenses, commentators have sparred over the correct balance
between the defendant's right to control his fate and society's interest
in refusing to punish those whom it considers morally blameless by
virtue of their mental illness.71
The perfect storm for these issues was the federal capital murder
trial of alleged "Unabomber" Theodore Kaczynski. The defense
attorneys appointed to represent Kaczynski decided to present a
defense based on mental illness, but Kaczynski objected to the
presentation of any mental health evidence." The trial judge ruled
that the attorneys could proceed with their presentation, and
Kaczynski requested the opportunity to represent himself.73 After the
court denied his request, Kaczynski pled guilty.74 On appeal, a
divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Kaczynski's
motion to vacate his guilty plea. The majority ruled that Kaczynski's
request to represent himself was untimely and dilatory and did not
render his subsequent plea involuntary.75 In dissent, Judge Reinhardt
(again) wrote that although the defense attorneys and trial judge
acted with noble intentions-and although Faretta is fundamentally
unsound-the judge violated Kaczynski's rights under that ruling.76
The Unabomber case led to a reinvigorated debate in the law
reviews: some making the case why "fairness must trump autonomy"
in cases involving mental health defenses,77 others criticizing the trial
Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 75, 105 (2002) ("The state's
interest is strong enough to outweigh the interests of the defendant. Therefore, the states
must require the presentation of mitigating evidence during capital sentencing even over
the objections of the defendant .... ); Christopher M. Johnson, The Law's Hard Choice:
Self-Inflicted Injustice or Lawyer-Inflicted Injury, 93 KY. L.J. (concluding that "the
community's collective interest in a just outcome must, in my view, outweigh the
defendant's separate interest in autonomy-in the power to influence that outcome")
(forthcoming Jan. 2005); Eric Rieder, Note, The Right of Self-Representation in the Capital
Case, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 130, 152 (1985).
71. Compare Note, supra note 50, at 957-60 (arguing for an approach that guides
courts in detecting voluntary rejections of the insanity defense), with Cohn, supra note 50,
at 314 (concluding that "the larger interest in an individual's autonomy and freedom of
choice must take precedence over the purported interest in refusing to punish the mentally
ill").
72. United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2001).
73. Id. at 1112.
74. Id. at 1112-13.
75. Id. at 1117-19.
76. Id. at 1119-20 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
77. Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 66, at 216; see also Josephine Ross, Autonomy Versus
a Client's Best Interests.: The Defense Lawyer's Dilemma when Mentally Ill Clients Seek to
Control Their Defense, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343, 1385-86 (1998) (defending right of
defense lawyer to use "surrogate decisionmaking" in such cases and "regard autonomy as
one of the client's interests but not necessarily the overarching one").
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judge and defense attorneys for denying Kaczynski control over his
defense. 8 A Note in the Harvard Law Review took the occasion to
reprimand both the Ninth Circuit majority and Judge Reinhardt for
showing insufficient regard for "the critical autonomy interests that
the right to self-representation is designed to protect."79 But what if,
far from being critical, the autonomy interests of Kaczynski-in his
role as a criminal defendant at trial-were not worth protecting at
all? What if fairness was being restricted for the sake of an idea that
is, in this context, meaningless?
II. "FREE CHOICE" IN THE ACCUSATORIAL AND ADVERSARIAL
TRADITIONS
"And whatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of
Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they understood the
inestimable worth of free choice."8  That the Supreme Court in
Faretta had to resort to such flimsy reasoning to justify the right to
self-representation81 does not detract from the fact that the freedom
of criminal defendants is an essential part of our modern criminal
justice system. Indeed, it is at the heart of the two major traditions
that distinguish American criminal justice and which have been
incorporated into our constitutional system: the accusatorial tradition
and the adversarial process. Far from lending support to these
traditions, or logically following from them, however, the Faretta
Court's establishment of defendant autonomy as an independent
value radically undermines them.
A. The Accusatorial Tradition
As Professor Abraham Goldstein observed thirty years ago,
while "accusatorial" and "adversarial" are frequently treated as
virtual synonyms, they refer to distinct concepts.82 The accusatorial
78. Michael Mello, The Non-Trial of the Century: Representations of the Unabomber,
24 VT. L. REV. 417, 511 (2000) ("There are choices and decisions that the person whose
life is on the line ought to be allowed to make, as a basic part of human dignity and
autonomy. Whether to stake your life on a mental defect defense is one of those
choices.").
79. Recent Cases: Ninth Circuit Affirms Denial of Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski's
Request to Represent Himself at Trial, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1253, 1256 (2002).
80. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-34 (1975).
81. Cf Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 751 (1989)
(describing as "astonishing" the Supreme Court's use of the phrase, "If the right to privacy
means anything, it is..." in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972)).
82. Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in
American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1974).
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tradition protects individual liberty by making it difficult for the
government to subject individuals to criminal sanctions. It assigns
''great social value to keeping the state out of disputes" and erects
high barriers to criminal charging, conviction, and punishment.83 It is
distinguished from the inquisitorial tradition in continental Europe,
which places an affirmative duty on judicial and prosecutorial officials
to see that the law is carried out and regards the accused as a primary
source of information and evidence.8'
With the highest per capita incarceration rate in the world," and
more than two million people in United States jails and prisons, 6 how
fully our accusatorial tradition is observed in practice is a reasonable
question. 87  Nevertheless, at least in theory, our criminal justice
system places a premium on protecting the liberty of those who might
be subjected to criminal charging and prosecution. The accusatorial
tradition provides the normative basis for a range of due process
safeguards in our constitutional system,8 including the "probable
cause" requirement for arrest, 9 the presumption of pretrial release,90
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,9 the presumption
of innocence and the placement of the burden of proof on the
prosecution,92 and the high "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for
83. Id. at 1017. In his essay, Professor Goldstein presented idealized descriptions of
the accusatorial and inquisitorial traditions and was careful to point out that the American
system of criminal justice incorporates many inquisitorial elements, just as European
inquisitorial systems have accusatorial elements. Id. at 1019.
84. Id. at 1018-19.
85. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, New Incarceration Figures: Rising Population
Despite Falling Crime Rates, at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf (last visited
Feb. 15, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
86. According to the Federal Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2,085,620 prisoners were
held in federal or state prisons or in local jails on December 31, 2003. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, Prison Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
87. See generally David Cole, As Freedom Advances: The Paradox of Severity in
America Criminal Justice, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455,455 (2001) (exploring how the United
States can simultaneously be "a leader of the 'free world' and of the incarcerated world").
88. See generally Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) (discussing how
coerced confessions "offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal
law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system"); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940) (explaining that the Due Process Clause was intended to
guarantee procedural safeguards "to protect, at all times, people charged with or
suspected of crime by those holding positions of power and authority").
89. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
90. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
91. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1985); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55
(1949).
92. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1978).
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that burden.9 3  Thus, the mere possession of a ne'er-do-well
reputation is inadequate to land a person in court, and the existence
of a reasonable doubt as to any element of a charged offense requires
an acquittal at trial.
Faretta does not comport with this tradition. Self-representation
makes it substantially more, not less, likely that a defendant will be
found guilty and punished, regardless of her actual culpability. In
addition to the obvious loss of legal expertise, pro se defendants face
unique problems handling evidence, addressing the jury, and
examining witnesses, and may have limited access to legal materials if
detained prior to trial.94 The Court itself acknowledged in Faretta
that it was "cutting against the grain" of its Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, the basic thesis of which being "that the help of a
lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair trial."95  It is
"undeniable" that in most cases "defendants could better defend with
counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts."96  Self-
representation, the Court later observed, is "a right that when
exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome
unfavorable to the defendant."'97
B. The Adversarial Process
1. The Fundamental Norm of Challenge
Even if Faretta's recognition of defendant autonomy as an
independent value cuts against the accusatorial tradition, it might still
advance the goals of a separate tradition in our criminal justice
system, the adversarial process. This tradition involves the method of
resolving disputes at trial. The parties-the prosecutor and the
93. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,362-64 (1970).
94. See generally Decker, supra note 29, at 560-69, 598 (considering the pro se
defendant's procedural concerns and concluding that self-representation is inadvisable).
95. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832-33 (1975). See also id. at 851 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("[F]rom start to finish the development of the right to counsel has been
based on the premise that representation by counsel is essential to ensure a fair trial.").
96. Id. at 834. This point was made even more bluntly by the dissenting justices.
There are "obvious dangers of unjust convictions in allowing all defendants to represent
themselves at trial." Id. at 851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The fact of the matter is that
in all but an extraordinarily small number of cases an accused will lose whatever defense
he may have if he undertakes to conduct the trial himself." Id. at 838 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
97. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984); see also Martinez v. Court of
Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) ("No one, including Martinez and the Faretta




defendant-play an aggressive role in presenting the evidence,
challenging their opponents, and shaping the legal issues. They do so
before a neutral and relatively passive judge and jury.9" The freedom
of the parties is not absolute: they are constrained by substantive law,
rules of procedure, ethical rules, and standards of decorum. The
prosecutor is further constrained by a general duty to see justice
done.9 9 Nevertheless, the American system depends far more on the
parties' aggressive pursuit of their own interests than do most
European systems, which depend instead on judicial supervision and
control to move the process along.'0
Elements of the adversarial process are also incorporated in our
constitutional system.' O' Among other rights, defendants are entitled
to compel the appearance of witnesses in their favor,102 to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, 103 to testify on their own behalf," to be
present at all stages of the trial,"5 and to have access to certain expert
services to assist in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of
their defense. 10 6 Perhaps the most important constitutional right in
this regard is the right to counsel.107  The Supreme Court has
premised its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence on the idea that by
promoting "partisan advocacy on both sides of a case," the provision
of counsel to defendants advances the ultimate goal of the adversarial
system-"that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."'08
Defense lawyers, the Court wrote in Gideon v. Wainwright,'0 9 are
"necessities, not luxuries" in the adversarial system."'
98. Goldstein, supra note 82, at 1016.
99. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (describing the prosecutor as "a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done").
100. Goldstein, supra note 82, at 1018-19.
101. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 123 (1978)
("[T]he adversary system stands with freedom of speech and the right of assembly as a
pillar of our constitutional system.").
102. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1970); Douglas
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,418 (1965).
104. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987).
105. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
106. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
107. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984).
108. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
109. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
110. Id. at 344 (stating that it is an "obvious truth" that "in our adversary system of
justice any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him").
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The adversarial and accusatorial traditions overlap in significant
respects, and not all procedures and rights can be cleanly divided into
"adversarial" or "accusatorial" baskets.'11 One important difference
is the way each tradition values defendant's liberty. While
accusatorial safeguards protect liberty as an inherent value, a good in
and of itself, the adversarial system protects the liberty of the
prosecutor and defendant (subject to the rules of substantive law,
procedure, ethics, etc.) as an instrumental value: because doing so
normally facilitates our adversarial justice system and, thus, advances
the cause of justice.
The qualifier "normally" is important. Underlying the
adversarial system is an expectation about how the parties should
behave-"a fundamental norm of challenge." '112 Prosecutors will seek
to convict and impose the punishment they believe appropriate,
under the applicable law and facts, to the offense. Defendants will
put up resistance, to the extent they can: filing motions, challenging
the government's evidence, cross-examining witnesses, arguing the
law, marshaling and presenting available exculpatory evidence, and
casting the facts in the best light during closing argument.1 3 They will
seek the dismissal of the charges, seek an acquittal if the case goes to
trial, and try to minimize the impact of any conviction.114 They will
take all steps allowed by law to secure either their release or the least
severe punishment possible.
This is not to say that every defendant must stage a Stalingrad
defense. A range of defense strategies may be appropriate based on
the facts of each case. A defendant may reasonably decide not to
pursue a particular strategy or invoke a particular right in order to
increase the likelihood of success on another strategy or to limit her
overall risk of conviction. Furthermore, even in our adversarial
system, limiting criminal liability is not the only appropriate goal for a
defendant. Acceptance of responsibility and expression of remorse
are desirable, even (or especially) when a more contentious approach
might produce a lesser sentence. 15 The same is true for the goals of
111. For example, the neutral and relatively passive role of trial judges serves both
traditions by allowing the parties to develop the evidence and legal issues adversarially
and by protecting the accused's status as an innocent until a final verdict is reached.
112. Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 52, 52 (1967).
113. See id. (explaining that the adversary system "depends upon a constant, searching,
and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority at all stages of the
process").
114. See Dix, supra note 22, at 240.
115. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology
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sparing victims, family members, and witnesses the burden of
attending and participating in a long, contentious trial.
The problem arises when a defendant's conduct or objectives are
so completely contrary to our expectations that the adversarial
process fails to be "meaningful." This can occur in several ways.
Defense attorneys may fail to take basic steps in defense of their
clients because of incompetence, laziness, overwork, or institutional
pressures that lead them to take into consideration interests other
than those of their clients."6  And as we have seen, defendants
themselves may refuse to present exculpatory or mitigating evidence,
argue viable defenses, or otherwise act in an irrational or self-
destructive manner.
Such deviant conduct undermines the "fundamental norm of
challenge"'1 7 underlying the adversarial system and its ultimate
objectives. With respect to the performance of defense lawyers, the
Supreme Court has cautioned that the Constitution is not satisfied by
the mere presence of counsel at trial. Instead, to ensure that the
adversarial testing is "meaningful," defense counsel must perform
with a certain degree of competence." 8 As the Court wrote in 1984,
"if the process loses its character as a confrontation between
adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated .... 'While a
criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to
enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of
unarmed prisoners to gladiators.' "119 To be sure, at the same time it
wrote these words, the Court set forth a low standard for effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Applying this
standard, courts have sometimes upheld performances by defense
counsel ranging from the uninspired to the abysmal, even in capital
cases. 20  Nevertheless, the Court has not retreated from its
teleological (as opposed to formalistic) conception of the adversary
system, requiring judicial intervention when defense lawyers perform
into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 109-18 (2004) (discussing the social and
psychological benefits of remorse and apology).
116. See Meredith A. Nelson, Quality Control for Indigent Defense Contracts, 76 CAL.
L. REV. 1147,1149-68 (1988).
117. See Skolnick, supra note 112, at 52-53.
118. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984).
119. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.
1975)).
120. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1835-44 (1994); Jeffrey
Levinson, Don't Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 147-48 (2001).
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in a manner not likely to "advance the public interest in truth and
fairness."12'
As for self-destructive conduct by defendants themselves, the
next Section will show that until the Supreme Court recognized
defendant autonomy as an independent constitutional value in
Faretta, judges never doubted their authority to intervene, either to
take steps to restore meaningful adversarial testing or assume more
control over the trial itself.
2. Waiver and the "Protecting Duty" of Courts
Prior to the due process revolution of the twentieth century,
criminal defendants in America had few guaranteed rights. Of those,
courts seldom allowed them to be waived.
This hostility to waiver was exemplified in the "eleven juror"
cases of the nineteenth century, which rejected the validity of
convictions reached after defendants had consented to the removal or
disqualification of a juror during a trial. The common law view was
set forth by the New York Court of Appeals in its 1858 decision
Cancemi v. People:2'
Criminal prosecutions involve public wrongs, "a breach and
violation of public rights and duties," which affect "the whole
community, considered as a community, in its social and
aggregate capacity .... The penalties or punishments, for the
enforcement of which they are a means to the end, are not
within the discretion or control of the parties accused; for no
one has a right, by his own voluntary act, to surrender his
liberty or part with his life. The state, the public, have an
interest in the preservation of the liberties and the lives of the
citizens, and will not allow them to be taken away "without due
process of law," when forfeited, as they may be, as a
punishment for crimes. 23
This view reflected what might be described today as a "concern for
public-regarding justice.' 1 4  The criminal law existed to redress
violations that "affect the whole community.' 25 At the same time,
the public maintained an interest in the liberty of all its subjects-and
121. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981).
122. 18 N.Y. 128 (1858).
123. Id. at 136-37 (citations omitted).
124. See Tracey L. Meares, What's Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 215, 219
(2003).
125. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 136-37.
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that liberty could not be forfeited by consent, but only through due
process of law.
The idea of forfeiture can be traced to the influential writings of
John Locke, who believed that, while the rights to life and liberty
cannot be waived or transferred by its possessor, they can be forfeited
as punishment for an act of wrongdoing. 126 Quoting Blackstone, the
Cancemi court put it this way: "[T]he 'natural life, being the
immediate donation of the great Creator, cannot legally be disposed
of or destroyed by any individual, neither by the person himself nor
by any other of his fellow creatures, merely upon their own
authority.' ",127 The state can deprive a person of his life or liberty
only after he has forfeited his rights through the commission of a
crime.
Early American courts applied the concept of inalienability
broadly in criminal cases. Defendants had very limited ability to
affect the system through the waiver of rights. While they could
dispense with such procedural "particulars" as objecting to jurors and
contesting certain facts, they could not consent to such "radical
changes in great and leading provisions" of trial procedure as the
"highly dangerous innovation" of eleven-person juries.128  The trial
court's consent to a defendant's waiver was sufficient ground for an
appellate court to vacate the conviction.2 9 As late as 1898, the U.S.
126. See Hugo Bedau, The Right to Life, 52 THE MONIST 550, 567-68 (1968); Joel
Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 93,
111-12 (1978); Terrance McConnell, The Nature and Basis of Inalienable Rights, 3 J.L. &
PHIL. 25, 28-29 (1984); A. John Simmons, Inalienable Rights and Locke's Treatises, 12
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175, 178-79 (1983). The idea of inalienable rights is also reflected in
the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude even if
entered into voluntarily. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242-45 (1911). The only
exception to the Amendment's command involves "punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. Thus, the right not
to be enslaved can be forfeited, but not alienated.
127. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 137 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
129); see also Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884) (holding that a defendant cannot
waive his right to be present at trial because "[t]he public has an interest in his life and
liberty"), quoted in Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 84 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374 (1892).
128. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 137-38. The critical importance of trial by jury as a means of
protecting liberty was unquestioned in early American history. See DAVID J.
BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN HISTORY 32-34
(1991); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 261, 269-70 (1979).
129. For another example, see State v. Carman, 18 N.W. 691 (Iowa 1884), overruling
State v. Kaufman, 2 N.W. 227 (Iowa 1879). See generally Susan C. Towne, The Historical
Origins of Bench Trial for Serious Crime, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 123, 154-55 (1982)
(criticizing Cancemi and Carman).
2005]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court, following the logic of Cancemi, prohibited a federal
defendant from consenting to trial by an eight-person jury. 130
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw significant
changes in the American system of criminal justice. As
bureaucratization and professionalism developed among judges and
prosecutors, an increased emphasis on efficiency began to affect
notions of due process in criminal trials."' The development of
various due process protections-and, in particular, the increased
availability of defense counsel-alleviated courts' concern that
defendants might waive or bargain away rights without understanding
the inherent risk.132
At the same time, plea bargaining, once actively discouraged by
judges,133 came to dominate the criminal system. A defendant who
pleads guilty effectively waives at once the privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to confrontation, and the right to a jury
trial.' It is, as one writer put it, "the entire ball game.' 1 35 As plea
bargaining emerged as the primary means of resolving criminal
charges, courts began to regard concerns about inalienable rights and
self-destructive waiver as anachronistic, and asked why they should
prevent a defendant from waiving a jury trial if he could relinquish
the right to trial altogether. As the Supreme Court eventually asked,
"If he be free to decide the question for himself in the latter case,
notwithstanding the interest of society in the preservation of his life
and liberty, why should he be denied the power to do so in the
former?"' 36
In 1904, the Supreme Court permitted defendants to waive jury
130. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1898). At the time of the offense, Utah
was a territory under the jurisdiction of the federal government. The Court held that the
jury provisions in Article III and the Sixth Amendment carried the implied condition that
defendants be tried before a jury composed of "not less than twelve persons." Id. at 350.
The very jurisdiction of a federal court to issue a criminal conviction, when the defendant
had pleaded not guilty, rested on the foundation of a jury verdict. Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276, 294 (1930) (citing Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 92 (6th Cir. 1909)).
131. BODENHAMER, supra note 128, at 83-87.
132. See Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal
Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 121 (1999).
133. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW & SoC'Y REV.
211, 214-17 (1979); Langbein, supra note 128 at 264-65.
134. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
135. Ralph S. Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126
U. PA. L. REV. 473, 476 (1978).
136. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 305, 309-10 (1930); see also Schick v. United
States, 195 U.S. 65, 71-72 (1904) (reasoning that the ability of a defendant to plead guilty




trials in cases involving petty criminal offenses. 3 7 It expanded this
ruling to all cases in its 1930 decision Patton v. United States. 138 There
the Court reasoned that the framers had intended to preserve the
right to trial by jury "primarily for the protection of the accused."' 13 9
The ancient doctrine that the accused could waive nothing was no
longer necessary in light of the changed conditions of the criminal
law. 4° At common law, Justice Sutherland explained, punishments
were much more severe, 4' and defendants were afforded few of the
procedural protections available today. In an effort to alleviate the
harshness of these conditions, and out of a then-well-founded
"anxiety of the courts to see that no innocent man should be
convicted," common law judges demanded that all parties strictly
adhere to "every technical requirement" of criminal procedure. 42
Yet ever since the "humane policy" of modem criminal law had
established rights by which a defendant could effectively make a
defense, courts no longer had any reason to abide by the ancient
doctrine. 43 Defendants could be trusted to act in their own self-
interest, and in some circumstances (such as the existence of
overwhelmingly negative pretrial publicity) waiver of jury trial might
be in the defendant's best interests. 144
Patton was the culmination of a substantial shift in American
criminal justice: from the public-regarding, paternalistic, trial-based
system exemplified by Cancemi to a system emphasizing bureaucratic
efficiency, plea bargaining, and a general reliance on the ability of
137. Schick, 195 U.S. at 71-72. The Court stated, "When there is no constitutional or
statutory mandate, and no public policy prohibiting, an accused may waive any privilege
which he is given the right to enjoy." Id.
138. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
139. Id. at 296-98. Although the specific issue in Patton involved the constitutionality
of a verdict reached by eleven jurors--one had withdrawn, as in Cancemi-the Court
shifted its focus to the validity of bench trials generally, which, it wrote, "in substance
amount[ed] to the same thing." Id. at 290.
140. Id. at 307-08 (quoting Hack v. State, 124 N.W. 492, 494-95 (Wis. 1910)).
141. At English common law, criminal conviction was often accompanied by such
significant third-party effects as corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate. Id. at 296
(citing Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 820 (1st Cir. 1908) (Aldrich, J., dissenting));
see also Dix, supra note 22, at 217-18 (explaining that interests of persons other than the
defendant were often at stake at common law); Michael E. Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of
Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 n.28 (1970) (noting
that at common law, because the consequences of a felony conviction affected the relatives
of the defendant, waiver of trial was not permitted).
142. Patton, 281 U.S. at 307 (quoting Hack v. State, 124 N.W. 492, 494-95 (Wis. 1910)).
143. Id. at 308. This historical account was cited with approval by Justice Black in
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
144. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942); Edward L.
Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA. L. REV. 478, 488-89 (1981).
2005] 647
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
defendants to act in their own interest. Indeed, the Patton Court
went so far as to describe the fear that a defendant might use waiver
for self-destructive purposes as "based more upon useless fiction than
upon reason.' '1
45
Still, the anti-paternalism of the Court did not reach so far as to
give defendants a right to waive jury trials. Rather, it held, waiver
could be conditioned on the consent of the judge and prosecutor. 146
Such a policy, the Court explained in Singer v. United States,47
recognizes that the state maintains an interest "in seeing that cases in
which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the
tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a
fair result.' 1 48 Indeed, it wrote, "[t]he ability to waive a constitutional
right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the
opposite of that right.' 149
With the conspicuous exception of the right to counsel, the rule
established in Patton and Singer remains the law today. Courts may
allow a defendant to waive the benefits afforded him by the Sixth
Amendment's Public Trial, State and District, and Confrontation
Clauses, but he does not have a right to compel a private trial,
transfer his case to another district, or "try the case by stipulation."'5 °
In each situation, the defendant's waiver can take effect only if the
trial judge, and in some cases the prosecutor, consents. Even with the
meteoric rise of plea bargaining in the twentieth century, the Court
has steadfastly refused to recognize a right of defendants to plead
guilty; entry of pleas remains conditional on the court's approval. 5'
In recognizing a right to insist on the opposite of the right to
counsel, Faretta was and remains an exceptional ruling. There is a
significant difference between permitting a benefit to be waived upon
the consent of the court and establishing waiver as a right.
The sole condition that courts impose on the ability of
defendants to exercise the Faretta right is a minimum level of mental
competence. In Johnson v. Zerbst,5 2 the decision that recognized a
right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants in federal court,
the Court also established the "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent"
145. Patton, 281 U.S. at 296 (quoting Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 810, 820 (1st
Cir. 1908) (Aldrich, J., dissenting)).
146. Id. at 312.
147. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
148. Id. at 36.
149. Id. at 34-35.
150. Id.
151. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.ll (1970).
152. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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standard used today for most attempted waivers of important trial
rights. 53 While the standard has been described as carrying no
"normative preference for or against waiver, "154 its actual effect
depends greatly on the context in which it is applied. Prior to Faretta,
the discretion of trial judges in deciding whether to permit waiver of
the right to counsel was practically unbounded. 55 In Johnson, Justice
Black emphasized that a trial judge had a "serious and weighty
responsibility"-a "protecting duty"-to see that counsel was not
waived improperly. 56 After investigating the facts of the case
"including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused,"
trial judges had to "indulge every reasonable presumption" against
waiver when making their final decisions.1 57 The practical effect of
this cautionary language was to incline judges to resolve doubts
against the waiver of counsel, and to protect defendants whenever the
evidence suggested that their choices might be self-destructive.
Significantly, before Faretta, no conviction had ever been reversed
because the trial court refused to allow the defendant to proceed pro
se.
158
As this discussion has shown, the right and duty of courts to
153. The Supreme Court has explained that because the Johnson standard applies to
the waiver of rights directly related to "the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial,"
it involves a more demanding judicial determination than standards governing other
rights. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1973).
154. William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 777
n.48 (1989); see also Tigar, supra note 141, at 8 (stating that the Johnson standard "stresses
the consensual, 'free choice' character of waiver and its ultimate reliance upon the
individual's freedom to forego benefits or safeguards through the uncoerced exercise of
his rational faculties"). The Johnson standard is an example of what some writers call
"soft paternalism" in that it seeks only to protect individuals from the consequences of
possibly involuntary conduct. See 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF 12 (1986). Whether such a requirement is paternalistic
at all is debatable. Id. at 12-16.
155. One court observed:
Prior to Faretta, this Court held that an accused may waive the right to counsel and
defend himself, but this was a discretionary matter for the trial court to decide.
The defendant had no right to represent himself, but merely the opportunity if the
trial court found it feasible and the defendant made a knowing, voluntary and
intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.
Parker v. State, 556 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (citations omitted).
156. 304 U.S. at 465.
157. Id. at 464; see also Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957) (stating that a
"finding of waiver is not lightly to be made"); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24
(1948) (plurality opinion) (holding that a 'penetrating and comprehensive examination"
must be made).
158. Michael P. Erhand, Note, The Pro Se Defendant's Right to Counsel, 41 U. CIN. L.
REV. 927, 928 (1972).
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protect defendants from self-destructive decisionmaking has been an
integral component of American criminal justice. Even as defendants
gained due process protections and greater control over the conduct
of their defenses, including the ability to waive certain rights and
benefits, courts maintained the ultimate authority to prevent
defendants from acting in a manner that was manifestly contrary to
their own interests and society's interests in a fair proceeding. They
maintained their authority to intervene as necessary to preserve the
"fundamental norm of challenge" underlying the adversarial system.
By recognizing a constitutional right to waive an obvious benefit,
and by limiting the authority of courts to prevent its self-destructive
exercise, Faretta was a radical break from prior tradition and
jurisprudence. It was not the next logical step in the due process
revolution or the development of America's adversarial process.
Quite the contrary. In enabling defendants to dispense with the right
to counsel, which by 1975 had come to be understood as critical to the
effective functioning of the adversarial system, Faretta all but ratified
the "sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators" and undermined a
primary reason for allowing waiver of rights in the first place. It is
thus no exaggeration to say that Faretta not only "cut against the
grain" of the Court's previous Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, but
also undermined foundational principles of modern American
criminal procedure.
III. AUTONOMY IN THE CRIMINAL TRIAL
Even though Faretta broke from prior law and tradition, it might
be argued, its recognition of a new constitutional value-protecting
the right of a defendant to make certain decisions independent of
concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding-was an overdue
breakthrough for individual autonomy, one that has only begun to be
realized in the criminal justice system. A closer examination,
however, exposes the incoherence of this claim. Put simply,
defendants lack the necessary conditions for the exercise of
autonomy, in any meaningful sense of the term. It is helpful to begin
by contrasting defendant autonomy with the more vibrant conception
of autonomy that the Supreme Court has applied to allow Americans
outside the criminal justice system to determine their own lives.
A. Autonomy as a General Constitutional Value
The idea of autonomy has acquired considerable popularity in
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the United States and other western societies. 59  It has been
embraced by philosophers whose views intersect in few other ways.
16
Kant, for example, considered autonomy an inherent value of all
persons and a necessary precondition for morality,6 whereas
Nietzsche championed autonomy because it allows a person to escape
the shackles of morality and establish his own values.
162
As autonomy has played an increasingly important role in
modern moral and political philosophy, so has it become central to
the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence. 163 It first emerged
as a constitutional value in the 1920s when the Supreme Court
applied the principle of substantive due process to shield from state
interference the ability of parents to direct the upbringing and
education of their children."6  The Court thereafter extended
constitutional protection to a range of personal decisions and
activities including the right to procreate, 65 the right to marry,66 the
right to travel freely through the states,167 and the right to live with
one's nuclear or extended family.1 68  In its First Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court has applied the guarantees of religious
liberty, association, and free speech to protect the ability of
individuals to create and to act on their own values and preferences
"often precisely against the conflicting standards of reasonable value
held by the state or persons who control the state." '169 Most
spectacularly, the Court has applied the so-called "right to privacy" to
protect the right of individuals to use contraceptives, 70 the right of
women to terminate early pregnancies, 7' and the right of gays and
159. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369-70 (1986).
160. See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 57-58
(1988).
161. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 74-79 (H.
J. Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964).
162. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 58-60 (Walter
Kaufman et al. trans., Vintage 1969).
163. See generally PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY 154-70 (1992)
(detailing the Court's constitutionalization of individual autonomy).
164. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
165. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
166. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
167. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
168. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503-04 (1977).
169. David A.J. Richards, Autonomy in Law, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 246, 252 (John Christman ed., 1989).
170. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965).
171. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860-61 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973).
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lesbians to engage in intimate sexual conduct.172
"Privacy," of course, is a misnomer for the legal protection that
the Court recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut173 and thereafter
applied to other personal decisions. Privacy "consists of the ability of
an individual to maintain control of the information about himself
that is available to others." '174 In deciding to prohibit the use of
contraception, Connecticut was attempting to interfere with its
citizens' procreative decisions, not scrutinize their intimate lives."7 '
To the extent that Griswold and Roe v. Wade'76 are seen as attempts
to protect individuals' self-determination, they fit in well with the
Court's other autonomy-based rulings.
The Court forcefully recapitulated its vision of autonomy in its
recent sodomy decision, Lawrence v. Texas.'77 The liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause, it wrote, "presumes an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct."'78 Courts uphold this presumption by shielding a
range of fundamental individual behaviors and decisions-including
"decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education"' 79 -from unwarranted
governmental intrusion. The Court restated the constitutional basis
for autonomy first set forth in Casey:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
172. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
173. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
174. DWORKIN, supra note 160, at 103 (1988).
175. The concepts of privacy and autonomy are related in that violations of each
"exhibit a common failure to respect another person as an independent moral agent," but
they "do so in different ways and ought not to be assimilated." Id. at 103-04; see also
RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION 53 (1993) (distinguishing between "territorial"
sense of privacy, confidentiality, and "sovereignty over personal decisions"). The Court
has extended constitutional protection to a range of privacy interests, properly
understood, including the interests against "disclosure of personal matters," Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977), unwarranted intrusions into the privacy of one's home,
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), and invasions of bodily integrity, Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
176. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
177. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
178. Id. at 562.
179. Id. at 574.
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Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 80
Some have argued that Faretta is the logical application of these
principles to criminal defendants. 181 A few have gone so far as to
argue that Faretta represents the apex of the Court's respect for
individual autonomy and should be replicated more fully outside the
criminal-trial context. 82  Given the individualistic rhetoric that
animates both Faretta and the Court's substantive due process
jurisprudence, the connection is not wholly disingenuous. Indeed,
one of the longstanding objections to the Court's substantive due
process jurisprudence has been its lack of obvious limits. While the
Court has stated that the Constitution protects those decisions and
activities that are "fundamental" to the ability of persons to
determine their own existence, the line on what qualifies as
fundamental is far from clear.'83 To some, this problem reflects the
fact that there are "no obvious limits" on the philosophical concept of
autonomy itself, since "any act at all can be vested with vast personal
significance by a particular person. '"184 Nevertheless, the Court has
made clear that some line, however arbitrary, will be observed in its
constitutional jurisprudence. As the Court wrote in Washington v.
Glucksberg,a85 a decision rejecting the right to assisted suicide, "[t]hat
many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping
conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal
decisions are so protected." '186
In Lawrence, the Court characterized its jurisprudence as
180. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
181. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives,
37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1747-53 (1992) (arguing that the adversarial process and such
procedural protections as the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and
the right to self-representation "further reflect the high value the Constitution places on
individual autonomy").
182. See, e.g., Lois Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy After Washington v. Glucksberg:
An Essay About Abortion, Death, and Crime, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431, 466
(1998) ("Why, for example, should we not be required to treat women walking from their
cars to abortion clinics in the exercise of their autonomous choices with at least the degree
of respect we accord criminal defendants exercising their pro se rights in court .... ).
183. See RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 268-72 (1977); see also
Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 752 ("To define 'fundamental' rights as those that cover
matters 'fundamentally affecting persons' is less than entirely satisfactory.").
184. KAHN, supra note 163, at 156.
185. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
186. Id. at 727-28 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35
(1973)).
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involving certain areas of human activity: "marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education." ''"7
This catalog could hardly be more removed from the kinds of
decisions a criminal defendant makes at trial. Of course, the Court
has applied principles of substantive due process in the criminal
realm. It has, for example, held that prisoners have liberty interests
in avoiding an involuntary transfer to a mental hospital,188 and in
avoiding the unwanted administration of psychotropic drug.l"9 The
Court has also applied the Due Process Clause to protect the rights of
pretrial detainees to humane treatment and conditions,190 and
reversed state convictions in cases where the defendant was denied
"fundamental fairness" at trial. 191 These cases reflect the breadth of
issues that the Court has addressed under the rubric of substantive
due process. In none of them, however, has the Court suggested that
the value of autonomy that has emerged in Griswold, Roe, Casey, and
Lawrence applies to the decisions of criminal defendants at trial, or
commands any degree of deference to defendants' preferences by
trial judges.
It is telling that while Roe was decided only two years before
Faretta, that latter case-so concerned with the "free choice" of
defendants-made no mention of the earlier landmark ruling
protecting the personal decisions of women in the free world. The
disconnect continues to the present day. The same five justices that
championed autonomy as a constitutional value in Lawrence joined
the majority decision so dismissive of defendant autonomy in
Martinez three years earlier. 92 And Justice Scalia, who in Lawrence
ridiculed the "famed sweet-mystery-of-life passage" of Casey quoted
above,193 wrote a concurring opinion in Martinez disclaiming the
187. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
188. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980).
189. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); see also Sell v. United States,
539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003) (establishing limited conditions under which government may
involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to render mentally ill defendant competent to
stand trial).
190. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979).
191. See Meares, supra note 124, at 217-20. Meares discusses the Court's
"fundamental fairness" jurisprudence as a counterpoint to the Court's focus on the Sixth
Amendment in Gideon-in her view, a "foundational shift" from "public-regarding
justice" to the autonomy-based jurisprudence exemplified by Faretta. Id. at 225.
192. Justice Kennedy, the author of Lawrence, joined the opinion in Martinez but
stated that it was "unnecessary to cast doubt upon the rationale" of Faretta. Martinez v.
Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 164 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
193. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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majority's "apparent skepticism" about Faretta'94
While this disconnect might be explained as a consequence of the
Court's general failure to integrate its criminal and non-criminal
constitutional principles, 95 a better explanation is the fact that free-
world autonomy and the idea of autonomy at issue in Faretta are alien
concepts. As the next Section will explain, it is simply not coherent to
speak of autonomy in the context of the artificial and limited
decisions that arise in criminal trials. The concept of autonomy has
come to play a vibrant and resilient role in the Court's greater
constitutional jurisprudence, but as used in Faretta and its progeny, it
is an illusion.
B. The Absence of Conditions for Autonomy
1. Mental Competence, Independence, and an Adequate Range of
Options
While autonomy has been said to have a "protean" nature,
resisting easy definition,' 96 scholars generally agree that it is a far
richer concept than "free choice." The etymology of the word
indicates that it is the "law" or "rule" of oneself.197  Rather than
simply the ability to choose from a fixed menu of options at a
particular point in time, autonomy involves the determination or
authorship of one's own life. 9 ' Justice Scalia's derision
194. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 165 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Our system of laws generally
presumes that the criminal defendant, after being fully informed, knows his own best
interests and does not need them dictated by the State. Any other approach is unworthy
of a free people.").
195. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997) (noting the rift between traditional constitutional
law and criminal procedure and arguing for a renewed synthesis).
196. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 876
(1994); see also DWORKIN, supra note 160, at 6 (stating that autonomy has at various times
been "equated with dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility, and self-
knowledge"); Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information,
and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 31-32 (2001) (explaining that autonomy "has remained a
surprisingly nebulous and ill-defined term in philosophical inquiry").
197. See DWORKIN, supra note 160, at 12-13; FEINBERG, supra note 154, at 27. Based
on the more frequent application of the term to states and institutions, Feinberg notes that
the idea of individual autonomy may be a "political metaphor." FEINBERG, supra note
154, at 27-28. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's use of "autonomy" to describe the
rights of states, Indian tribes, and businesses, see John P. Safranek & Stephen J. Safranek,
Can the Right to Autonomy Be Resuscitated After Glucksberg?, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 731,
737-38 (1998).
198. Joseph Raz, Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle, in ISSUES IN
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 313-14 (Ruth
Gavison ed., 1987). See also DWORKIN, supra note 175, at 166 (describing autonomy as
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notwithstanding, many have found the "right to define one's own
concept of existence" formulation of Casey to be an elegant
encapsulation of the idea of autonomy. Others have cited Isaiah
Berlin's account of what he called "positive liberty":
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on
external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of
my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject,
not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes,
which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were,
from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer-
deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted
upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or
an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is,
of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing
them. 19
How incomprehensible and unattainable this wish list would be
to a person undergoing a criminal trial! In the United States, most
criminal defendants charged with serious offenses spend the time
leading up to their trial in jails, "total institutions" which subject
inmates to comprehensive and absolute rules and commands0 0 and
generally afford them no more safe or humane living conditions than
convicted prisoners. Even if released before trial, the looming
presence of a pending criminal charge severely constrains the choices
a defendant can make in life. At the trial itself-the forum within
which the Faretta notion of "autonomy" specifically applies-the
defendant has no ability to "conceive of his own goals and policies
and realize them." He is free only to choose among the options that
"external forces" afford him, options both created and bounded by
the rules of procedure, rules of evidence, and substantive law: for
example, how to plead, what defenses to present, whether to testify or
remain silent, what information should be presented to the jury and
the right "to confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and value of
their own lives for themselves, answering to their own consciences and convictions");
Gerald Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 54, 60 (John Christman ed., 1989) (stating that while autonomy
encompasses the entire way one lives one's life, freedom is "decided at specific points in
time").
199. Isaiah Berlin, Inaugural Address Before the University of Oxford (Oct. 31, 1958),
in Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 118, 131
(1969).
200. See ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF
MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 1-124 (1961); see also RAZ, supra note 159, at
418-19 ("Imprisoning a person prevents him from almost all autonomous pursuits.").
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how, what objections and legal arguments to make. These limited
choices are a far cry from the rich vision of liberty contemplated by
Berlin, or even the minimal degree of free movement, independence,
and choice that ordinary Americans would consider essential to their
sense of self.
As discussed in Part II, the only condition that courts impose on
the exercise of Faretta autonomy is a minimum level of mental
competence. Under the Johnson "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
standard," courts ask whether the defendant actually understands the
consequences of a particular decision and whether he is acting
voluntarily.2"' Yet while a minimum level of mental ability is a
necessary condition for autonomy, it is not sufficient. As the
philosopher Joseph Raz has explained, for a person to be
"significantly autonomous,""2 2 she must also be independent and have
an adequate range of options.20 3
The condition of independence requires that one's choices not be
dictated by personal needs. It also requires that one's choices not be
coerced or manipulated. Both coercion and manipulation are
intentional acts that "subject the will of one person to that of
another":" coercion by diminishing a person's options; manipulation
by perverting "the way that person reaches decisions, forms
preferences or adopts goals."20 5 While the degree of independence
necessary for autonomy has been debated, a defendant in a criminal
trial clearly cannot be described as independent in this way. All of
the relevant choices are coerced and manipulated by the law. Indeed,
the entire criminal justice system is, by design, coercive: it is the state,
through its legal rules, procedures, and other authority, that
establishes the defendant's choices and constraints on what he may
do.
The "voluntariness" component of the Johnson standard
considers whether the defendant has been coerced in expressing his
preferences with respect to the choices afforded him in court. It does
not consider the artificiality of those choices, or the fact that the
defendant's preferences have been shaped, if not altogether
201. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 465, 469 (1937).
202. RAZ, supra note 159, at 154.
203. Id. at 372; see also Fallon, supra note 196, at 886 (arguing that necessary
conditions for descriptive autonomy include "(i) critical and self-critical ability, (ii)
competence to act, (iii) sufficient options, and (iv) independence of coercion and
manipulation").
204. RAZ, supra note 159, at 378.
205. Id. at 377.
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generated, by the criminal justice system itself. It is only this narrow
perspective that allows courts to speak of "autonomy" when allowing
mentally competent capital defendants to waive the presentation of
mitigating evidence, without giving any thought to the factors that led
the defendants to form their preference for execution or considering
whether they would have developed such a death wish in the outside
world.
As Gerald Dworkin and Harry Frankfurt have explained,
autonomy involves not merely the voluntary expression of a person's
immediate or "first-order" preferences, but rather the capacity to
make those preferences "authentic" through independent and critical
reflection and consideration of "higher-order" preferences and
values. °6 A person is autonomous only "if he identifies with his
desires, goals, and values, and such identification is not influenced in
ways which make the process of identification in some way alien to
the individual. '27 Authenticity is not possible for defendants making
decisions within the closed, regimented, and circumscribed context of
the criminal justice system, and it is a mistake for courts to assign
special constitutional value to particular preferences on the ground
that they are somehow intrinsic to the defendant's sense of self.
Nor is the other necessary condition for autonomy-the
existence of an adequate range of options-available to criminal
defendants. To be autonomous, a person needs options of sufficient
variety to enable him "to sustain throughout his life activities which,
taken together, exercise all the capacities human beings have an
innate drive to exercise, as well as to decline to develop any of
them. '208  There is, of course, some circularity in a conception of
autonomy that says people should be allowed to exercise all the
capacities that they have "an innate drive to exercise." Yet no matter
where the line is drawn, it is clear enough that significant autonomy
does not lie with respect to the decisions and actions taken by a
defendant in a criminal trial. Again, the state's coercive authority
sharply limits the options available to the defendant. This point
hardly needs illustration: a defendant may be afforded the
206. DWORKIN, supra note 160, at 61; Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the
Concept of a Person, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 64
(John Christman ed., 1989); see also John Christman, Introduction, in THE INNER
CITADEL 3, 13 (John Christman ed., 1989) ("[A]t its most basic level of application,
autonomy is more properly seen as a property of preference or desire formation.").
207. DWORKIN, supra note 160, at 61.
208. RAZ, supra note 159, at 375; see also Fallon, supra note 196, at 888 & n.83 (noting
that the " 'happy slave' is not autonomous just because her goals and desires have shrunk
adaptively to fit the options open to her").
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opportunity to present certain evidence or register certain objections
during the course of a trial, but the choices not available to such a
person-e.g., to shut the trial down, visit Europe, enroll in medical
school-are limitless.
It is of no consequence that the few choices afforded a defendant
may have grave consequences. Clearly, criminal trials fundamentally
affect the defendants involved, and a defendant's decision can
sometimes mean the difference between life and death. The question,
however, is whether sufficient conditions, including independence
and a sufficiently diverse range of options, exist to say that the
defendant can define his own existence. That cannot be said of any
defendant, capital or otherwise. As Raz wrote of his hypothetical
Hounded Women, hunted perpetually by a carnivorous animal on a
small desert island: even if she has enough resources to choose
between survival and death, it cannot be said that this choice has
anything to do with autonomy-"and we need not deny that she may
be very grateful that at least she was left this choice."2 9
2. Ascriptive Autonomy
To this point, the Article has discussed the empirical condition of
autonomy. Building on an analysis by Joel Feinberg,21 ° Richard
Fallon explained that "descriptive" autonomy regards autonomy as a
matter of degree and recognizes that while people "who are able to
deliberate with critical insight and self-awareness and to choose from
abundant options are highly autonomous," others may not be
autonomous at all.211  Normative or "ascriptive" autonomy, by
contrast, regards all persons as fully autonomous, regardless of
whether the necessary conditions under the descriptive conception
exist. Under this view, autonomy is "a moral entitlement of
personhood": a right to have one's decisions respected in all
circumstances, not overridden by the paternalistic concerns of
others.212 It is, to use Feinberg's terminology, "autonomy as right. 21a
The distinction between the descriptive and ascriptive
209. RAZ, supra note 159, at 374-76.
210. Feinberg identified at least four usages of the term autonomy: the capacity to
govern oneself, the actual condition of self-government and its associated virtues, an ideal
of character derived from that conception, and a right to personal sovereignty.
FEINBERG, supra note 154, at 28. In setting forth the descriptive/ascriptive dichotomy,
Fallon acknowledged that he was painting with a broader brush. Fallon, supra note 196, at
879 n.20.
211. Fallon, supra note 196, at 877.
212. Id. at 878, 890-93.
213. FEINBERG, supra note 154, at 47.
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conceptions is useful to philosophical and legal thought. As Fallon
showed, autonomy-based policy arguments can produce dramatically
different results depending on how the term is used.214 In the First
Amendment context, for example, competing claims of descriptive
and ascriptive autonomy can produce arguments both for and against
government regulation of private speech and property.2 15 Applying
this dichotomy to the Faretta line of cases, however, is less fruitful. It
is one thing to ascribe autonomy to citizens generally,
notwithstanding the differences in conditions that may exist, for the
purpose of evaluating paternalistic government action. It is quite
another to begin with a closed system with rigidly circumscribed
options, created and maintained by the state, and argue that the
individuals placed within that system must be treated as
autonomous-that notwithstanding the obviously inadequate
conditions for autonomy in a criminal trial, the defendant's choices
must be respected out of respect for her moral sovereignty.
Such a claim raises the question of the extent to which even
ascriptive autonomy requires minimal threshold conditions. Fallon
acknowledged, for example, that a certain minimal threshold of
competence is required for ascriptive autonomy, which children and
the mentally retarded may not meet.216  A certain minimum
independence and range of options must also be necessary, since to
assume otherwise would lead to absurd results. The idea of
autonomy simply makes little sense, for example, when applied to
slaves or inmates in prisons, asylums, and concentration camps. Such
"total institutions" exist for the purpose of denying individuals
autonomy. It is similarly nonsensical to claim that the victim of a
highway robbery acts autonomously-even if he remains in full
possession of his mental faculties-when deciding how to answer the
demand, "your money or your life.' '217 To make the ascriptive claim
in such narrow, coerced circumstances is to render the very idea of
autonomy meaningless.
So too does the ascription of autonomy to criminal defendants
who must decide whether relinquish their right to legal
representation, present mental health defenses, or offer mitigating
evidence. These choices are created and circumscribed by the full
manipulative and coercive power of the state and neither qualitatively
or quantitatively involve the minimum range of options that people
214. Fallon, supra note 196, at 903.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 891 n.97.
217. See Gerald Dworkin, Acting Freely, 4 NOUS 367,372 (1970).
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rightfully expect in a free society. To paraphrase Raz, we need not
deny that a capital defendant, facing a lifetime in a prison cell, might
be grateful for the opportunity to secure a comparatively quick death
by execution 21 -but that is no reason to conclude that in making that
decision he is, in any meaningful respect, autonomous.
CONCLUSION: BREAKING THROUGH THE ILLUSION
Today, phrases such as "autonomy" and "free choice" resonate
throughout our constitutional and public discourse. The vision of
liberty that opens Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence-speaking
of "an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct" 219-- is one with appeal to
citizens across the political spectrum and cultural divides of this
nation, even if some strongly disagree with its application in
particular cases.
The rhetoric of autonomy and free choice, however, can also
mask or divert attention from inequality and injustice in our society.
Feminist scholars have shown that it is a mistake in our "era of
pervasive choice rhetoric" to overlook how women's choices are
exercised within a context of socially-constructed constraints. 20 This
insight applies with even greater force in the completely constructed
and constrained context of the criminal justice system.
In writing the Court's most recent ruling on the right to self-
218. See, e.g., BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Johnny 99, on NEBRASKA (Columbia Records
1982) (describing the desire of a young man sentenced to life in prison to be "put ... on
that killin' line" instead).
219. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
220. Marion Crain, Rationalizing Inequality: An Antifeminist Defense of the "Free"
Market, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 574-80 (1993) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
(1992)) (criticizing Professor Richard Epstein's "soulless" challenge to the
antidiscrimination principle and his assumption that women freely choose their
occupations); Martha Minow, Choices and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood Marshall, 80
GEO. L.J. 2093, 2100 (1992); see also Lucinda Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues
in the Search for Gender Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 914, 931-40 (1987) (arguing that "individual
choice" is not a fixed concept in society where humans are interdependent and
expectations are socially constructed); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and
Work: Judicial Interpretation of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases
Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1799-1815 (1990)
(arguing that judges have helped to establish the conditions for sex segregation in the
workplace by the ways in which they interpret working women's rights and choices); Joan
Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559, 1562-73 (1992) (examining the "covertly gendered" ideology of the "republic of
choice" as it has been applied to working mothers who choose abortions).
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representation, Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California,22 1 Justice
Stevens chose a telling metaphor. Discussing the historical evidence
relied on in Faretta, Stevens observed that before counsel was
guaranteed, self-representation was the only option for the indigent
defendant seeking to present any defense. "Thus," he wrote, "a
government's recognition of an indigent defendant's right to
represent himself was comparable to bestowing upon the homeless
beggar a 'right' to take shelter in the sewers of Paris. "222
Today, the rhetoric of rights continues to mask systemic
inequality and injustice. To be sure, more than forty years after
Gideon, there are few jurisdictions where the right to appointed
counsel is ignored altogether. Nevertheless, in too many American
courtrooms, the quality of counsel appointed for the poor is little
better than the quality of accommodations in the Paris sewers.
Pervasive deficiencies are reported in indigent defense systems of
many states.223  Courts routinely appoint lawyers who are
overburdened, inexperienced, or incompetent, and defendants bear
the consequences of their lawyers' poor performance.224
This was the real conundrum at issue in Faretta: not whether the
Constitution broadly protects the freedom of defendants to act in a
self-destructive manner, but what to do about the "rare instances" in
which a defendant "might in fact present his case more effectively by
conducting his own defense." '225 Anthony Faretta himself believed
221. 528 U.S. 152 (2000).
222. Id. at 156-57.
223. A committee recently appointed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded
that the state was inadequately funding county public defender offices. FINAL REPORT OF
THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS IN
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 163-98 (2003), at http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Index/Supreme/
BiasCmte/FinalReport.ch5.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). A Georgia Supreme Court commission described that state's system as
inadequate, unconstitutional, and responsible for much needless incarceration. Bill
Rankin, Indigent Defense Rates F, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 12, 2002, at Al. A report by
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund documented cases in which poor
Mississippi defendants-many charged with misdemeanor or juvenile offenses-waited in
overcrowded county jails for months, even years, before speaking to a lawyer. NAACP
LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI'S INDIGENT
DEFENSE CRISIS (Feb. 2003), at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/ms-assemblylinejustice.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
224. See Dix, supra note 22, at 222 (discussing the ability of defense counsel to waive
certain trial rights without consulting the defendant); Stuntz, supra note 154, at 796 (noting
that "[a]ppointed counsel are, sadly, often of poor quality").
225. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465
U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984) (stating that self-representation may "allow the presentation of
what may, at least occasionally, be the accused's best possible defense"); Stuntz, supra
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this was true in his case, and while we cannot confirm or deny his
belief from the available record, we can certainly acknowledge that
the concern he raised about his appointed public defender's "heavy
case load" may have been valid.226 And, of course, if Faretta were
convicted as a result of his overworked lawyer's failure to take the
necessary steps to prepare an adequate defense, it would be Faretta,
not his lawyer, who would go to prison.227
This problem was compounded, in the Court's view, by the
current rules on the allocation of power between defendants and
defense attorneys. "[L]aw and tradition" had given attorneys
substantial authority over how defendants' cases were presented at
trial: they retained the power to make a wide range of binding
strategic decisions over their clients' objections. 228 This allocation of
power, the Court found, was inconsistent with the fundamental
notions of agency underlying the Sixth Amendment:
The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate
that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the
Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant-not an
organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant
and his right to defend himself personally.229
For those who share the Faretta Court's concern about
defendants being punished for their lawyers' poor performance, the
current rules on the allocation of power between attorney and client
are troubling-particularly in the context of appointed indigent
representation, where the client has no financial leverage over his
lawyer's performance. (Unlike defendants who retain their own
counsel, the indigent cannot simply fire their appointed counsel and
obtain another.) Having noticed the problem, the Court might have
been expected to hold that the traditional allocation of power
between attorney and client violates the Sixth Amendment and take
the first step toward restructuring that relationship, so that
defendants retain authority to make reasonable strategic decisions in
their defense.2 11 Such a change to the attorney-client relationship, it
note 154, at 795-96 (acknowledging the "exceptional case" where defendant "would really
be better off" without counsel).
226. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807.
227. Id. at 834 ("The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal
consequences of a conviction.").
228. Id. at 820, and cases cited therein.
229. Id. at 820. The Amendment contemplates counsel as an "assistant" to the
defendant, not a master. Id.
230. This is not to say that there is a clear and obvious way to reform the current rules
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should be noted, would not undermine the accusatorial and
adversarial traditions discussed in Part II, since courts would retain
their longstanding authority and duty to prevent defendants from
making manifestly self-destructive decisions. Instead, it would allow
defendants to participate in deciding which of the range of reasonable
defense strategies should be employed at their trials.
The Court did not choose this path. Instead, it reverse-
engineered the self-representation solution through the following
syllogism: (1) a defendant who accepts "counsel as his
representative" in effect consents to the traditional allocation of
power;23 1 (2) such a relinquishment of power can be considered
consensual only if a viable alternative exists;232 (3) therefore, the right
to self-representation is implied by the Sixth Amendment.
This backwards logic allowed the Court to sing the constitutional
virtues of defendant control without challenging the structural rules
that deny it. In a subsequent case, Jones v. Barnes,233 the Court
fortified the status quo by rejecting the ineffective assistance claim of
a defendant whose appellate counsel refused to brief a nonfrivolous
claim that the defendant wanted raised.234 With the exception of a
few "fundamental decisions," the Court wrote, "an attorney's duty is
to take professional responsibility for the conduct of the case, after
consulting with his client. 235  As a result of these rulings, self-
representation has become the only way indigent defendants can
guarantee personal control over their defense strategies. The result
on the attorney-client relationship. Scholars continue to debate the proper allocation of
authority between defense counsel and criminal defendant. Compare Rodney J. Uphoff,
Who Should Control the Decision To Call a Witness: Respecting a Criminal Defendant's
Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 834 (2000) (distinguishing between the
traditional view of the lawyer-client relationship and "client-centered lawyering," and
outlining an approach by which defense counsel can balance the defendant's wishes with
the duty "to prevent clients from inflicting harm upon themselves") with Johnson, supra
note 70 (forthcoming Jan. 2005) (arguing that while defense counsel should carefully
consider the defendant's broader interests, the defendant should have the right to make
decisions opposed by counsel only in limited circumstances).
231. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821.
232. See id.
233. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
234. Id. at 745-46.
235. Id. at 753 n.6; see also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988) ("Although
there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and
publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer has-and must have-full
authority to manage the conduct of the trial."); Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and
Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 33-34
(1986) (noting the Barnes Court's approval of "lower courts' generally authoritarian view
of counsel's proper relationship to the accused").
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for the adversarial system is doubly perverse. Defendants seeking to
present their strongest defense face the "all-or-nothing" dilemma of
choosing to accept representation and sacrificing control over their
case, or waiving counsel and forgoing the benefits of professional
representation. 236  Defendants who seek their own destruction or
some other deviant objective are empowered.
Without question, it is encouraging that a majority of the current
justices appear ready to overturn Faretta. That step, however, should
not be taken without addressing the underlying systemic problems
that led the Court to rule the way it did. The Court made a mistake
in Faretta by concluding that establishment of the right of self-
representation was an appropriate response to the legitimate
concerns about indigent defense representation raised by the
petitioner. It made an even bigger mistake in using the rhetoric of
"free choice" to bolster its decision, without an appreciation of the
larger impact that rhetoric might have.
In correcting these mistakes, the Court should avoid the
reductionist approach to the problem of indigent defense
representation it took in Martinez. Disloyalty is far from central to
the problems that indigent defendants face in America's courtroom.237
Rather, it is lawyers who do not take the basic steps necessary to
prepare an adequate defense for their clients and thereby put the
lives and freedom of innocent defendants in jeopardy. Nor should the
Court settle for the unsatisfactory assertion that even when a defense
lawyer's performance is ineffective, it is "more effective than what the
unskilled [defendant] could have provided for himself." '238 The "rare
instances" when this assertion is false should be acknowledged and
addressed, not dismissed out of hand.
So, too, courts should examine structural problems that may exist
with mental health defenses and capital sentencing proceedings rather
than automatically defer to defendants' preferences under the guise
of respecting their "autonomy." There are good reasons why a
defendant might object to the presentation of a mental health defense
at trial, given the prospect of indefinite civil confinement and the
stigma attached to the designation "criminally insane." When faced
236. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 759 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
237. Cf. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 160-61 (2000) (suggesting
that the concern about defendant autonomy in Faretta involved mainly the fear of
disloyalty by a court-appointed attorney and then concluding that the concern is too
insignificant to require a right of self-representation in appellate proceedings). See supra
Part I.A.
238. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 161.
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with such an objection, courts should determine how best to reconcile
society's interests in withholding punishment from the mentally
irresponsible and restraining those believed to be dangerous, and
whether the traditional dichotomy between "remedial" civil
confinement and "punitive" imprisonment still makes sense.239 When
defendants in capital sentencing hearings express a preference for
execution over life imprisonment, courts should consider whether the
Eighth Amendment's individualized consideration requirement
extends only so far as the defendant himself desires to present
mitigating evidence, or whether relevant mitigating evidence must be
presented in all cases. If a court concludes that evidence or a defense
should be presented in spite of the defendant's wishes, a variety of
procedures can be used to depart from the normal adversarial mode
of proceedings.24 °
This Article does not claim that any of these structural problems
are easily resolved. Indeed, they raise complex and fundamental
questions about the Constitution and the traditions and purposes of
our criminal justice system. How best to deal with defendants who
are trapped in failing indigent defense systems? What
decisionmaking authority should be reserved for defendants under
the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment? How
should courts enforce the individualized consideration requirement of
the Eight Amendment when defendants seek death? What purpose
does the "insanity defense" serve when institutionalization imposes
more of a burden on the individual than the applicable criminal
sanction? The important point is not to let these difficult questions
become obscured by vague and incoherent choice rhetoric. Setting
aside platitudes about the "inestimable worth of free choice" will
allow for a more honest debate and, we can hope, a fairer and more
effective criminal justice system.
239. See Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd 369 U.S. 705
(1962).
240. See Carter, supra note 70, at 96; Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 66, at 217 (proposing
"a legislative recognition of a right to a bifurcated trial, in which a defendant could first
present her chosen defense and then defense counsel could present a defense based on
mental illness"); Laura A. Rosenwald, Note, Death Wish: What Washington Courts
Should Do When a Capital Defendant Wants to Die, 68 WASH. L. REV. 735, 750-52 (1993).
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